Anfang September meldeten Medien, dass ein B 52-Bomber "versehentlich" mit nuklearer Ladung über Amerika flog. Gibt es da denn gar keine Sicherheitsvorkehrungen, kein exaktes Procedere, keine Befehle höherer Stellen? Wenn wir dem Mainstream glauben, kann per Zufall alles passieren. Wenn wir aber tiefer in die Materie gehen, sehen wir, dass es in Wahrheit nicht so gewesen sein kann - immerhin entspricht das Beladen eines Bombers mit Nukes DEF CON 3, Defense Condition 3 (zuletzt beim Yom Kippur Krieg 1973, als man ein Eingreifen der UdSSR befürchtete, und an 9/11 ausgerufen).
US-Bomber flog mit Atomsprengköpfen Ende August 2007 quer übers Land (5.9.2007, Mainstream-Meldung):
"Dramatische Panne bei der US-Luftwaffe: Mit einem halben Dutzend scharfen Atombomben bestückt hat ein Langstreckenbomber des Typs B-52 die gesamten Vereinigten Staaten überflogen. Die Piloten wussten nichts von ihrer gefährlichen Fracht.
Washington - Über die Folgen im Falle eines Absturzes möchte man lieber nicht nachdenken: Ein US-Militärflugzeug vom Typ B-52 - genannt "Stratofortress" - ist Ende August entgegen den Vorschriften mit fünf gefechtsbereiten Atomsprengköpfen an Bord quer über die USA geflogen. Erst bei der Landung der Maschine nach mehrstündigem Flug sei festgestellt worden, dass an den Tragevorrichtungen unter den Tragflächen des Langstreckenbombers versehentlich scharfe Nuklearwaffen befestigt waren, teilte ein Sprecher des Pentagon heute mit."
Siehe aber auch: diese Nukes könnten was mit dem Iran zu tun haben, meint Ex-CIA-Agent Larry Johnson: "And how does someone watching a B-52 land identify the cruise missiles as nukes? It just does not make sense. So I called a old friend and retired B-52 pilot and asked him. What he told me offers one compelling case of circumstantial evidence. My buddy, let’s call him Jack D. Ripper, reminded me that the only times you put weapons on a plane is when they are on alert or if you are tasked to move the weapons to a specific site.
Then he told me something I had not heard before. Barksdale Air Force Base is being used as a jumping off point for Middle East operations. Gee, why would we want cruise missile nukes at Barksdale Air Force Base. Can’t imagine we would need to use them in Iraq. Why would we want to preposition nuclear weapons at a base conducting Middle East operations? His final point was to observe that someone on the inside obviously leaked the info that the planes were carrying nukes. A B-52 landing at Barksdale is a non-event. A B-52 landing with nukes. That is something else."
Ein User als Reaktion in Johnsons Blog:
"There is no way the weapons would have moved without a top-level [in this case I would guess the Decider, since he has the football, but certainly no lower than SecDef] directive to do so, because of treaty obligations dating to the Cold War, because of the potential for really big problems in the wrong hands or if there’s a crash during transport. There are radiological reports needed because of the gamma activity inherent from the design of these things, dealing with where they went, who was exposed, how much dose, etc., which requires a monitored crew [not necessarily the next ones in the flight line]. As you probably already know, things like this are most vulnerable to interdiction in transit."
Ein anderer zitiert die Federation of American Scientists:
"From FAS: “Beyond the safety issue of transporting nuclear weapons in the air, the most important implication of the Minot incident is the apparent break-down of nuclear command and control for the custody of the nuclear weapons. Pilots (or anyone else) are not supposed to just fly off with nuclear bombs, and base commanders are not supposed to tell them to do so unless so ordered by higher command. In the best of circumstances the system worked, and someone “upstairs” actually authorized the transport of nuclear cruise missiles on a B-52H bomber.”
Ein weiterer weist auf die Geschichte des Verzichts auf den Transport von Nuklearwaffen in der Luft hin:
"Nuclear Threat Initiative points out that the “US abandoned all nuclear-armed bomber flights in 1968,” due to the risk of radioactive fissile material being distributed in case of a crash. In 1991, Bushie Sr. ordered that nuclear weapons be removed from bombers and kept in storage facilities. [Armed bombers used to be kept on alert on the ground.] So, this accident, flying live nuclear weapons across the US, violates multiple layers of command and control systems and also four decades of policy. What are the odds? How can the military say with a straight face that all nukes are accounted for? If these weapons were being decommissioned, why fly them to another air force base, which is getting rid of its ACMs?"
Ein User arbeitete auf AIom-U-Booten:
"I worked on nuclear submarines for the Navy at Mare Island Naval shipyard for 20 years. As a Nuc worker I handled nuclear material and weapons for 15 of those years. The controls on weapons and nuclear fuel is insanely tight.. This story just CAN’T happen. The amount of people involved in logistics..Code 105 radcon, Engineers, Nuclear riggers, Code 1390 Engineers..Gawd the paperwork involved for anyone of the groups to sign off on.
This story is impossible.. Something else is afoot..
Who signed off and who told them too?
AND WHY do we need to be moving nuclear weapons unless a logistics operation is underway?"
Früherer Mechaniker der Air Force:
"As a former Airforce aircraft mechanic I was stunned when I heard the report that nukes had inadvertantly been loaded on a B-52 and flown across country. It would be a mistake of staggering porportions if this had happened by mistake. Anyone who is familiar with Airforce proceedures regarding even the simplist of proceedures where aircraft are concerned would know that it would be all but impossible to make this kind of mistake.
Those who work on the line are some of the most profesional men and women I have ever known. Every one of them understand the inherent risks that are involved in this kind of work and follow the proceedures accordingly. With the many layers of control that exist in this kind of work, there are too many individuals that have to sign off on anything that is done. Even more so when handling weapons of any kind."
Früherer Offizier:
"As a former Army EOD officer, I remember NOBODY touches a nuke with out many levels of command double checking on things, and signing off on multiple forms, and with the requirement of asecond person to double check each moveit is incredulas to thnk this cold be accidental.
I don’treally know which is truly the scarier senario …
Bush and Cheney are intentionally planning a nuke strike on Iran…"
Hoffen wir, der Ex-Offizier hat unrecht und sieht alles zu schwarz...
Alexandra Bader
Linktipp:
Wie oft beinahe schon ein Atomkrieg begonnen wurde - da spielten Irrtümer mit Bombern oft eine Rolle
Was die Federation of American Scientists zum "Irrtum" meint: "According to Hans Kristensen, a nuclear weapons expert at the Federation of American Scientists, "the error could not have come from confusing the Advanced Cruise Missile with a conventional weapons since no conventional form exists. So the munitions Airmen should have been easily able to spot the mistake. Other routine procedures were violated which suggests a rather obvious explanation for the error. The military munitions personnel were acting under direct orders, though not through the regular chain of military command."
Now the question is - How did a squadron commander get access to nuclear warheads? (Weapons of mass destruction?) All nuclear weapons are released only by upper echelon authority. There are fail-safe procedures and protocols in place to keep just this sort of thing from happening.A nuclear submarine commander cannot launch his nuclear missiles without direct orders from the Commander in Chief or next in the chain of command. There are authentication codes and redundant verification procedures to stop this from happening."
Mein
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